Can social behaviour be probabilistic? Classical results in evolutionary game theory seem to suggest that recognizable asymmetries between individuals in the likelihood of winning fights (i.e. in resource holding power, RHP) rule out the stable probabilistic behaviour associated with mixed strategies. Here, using a variant of the hawk-dove game, I show that these mixed strategies can be common in asymmetric contests, because opponents of similar RHP benefit by ignoring discernable differences to form RHP equivalence categories. This process of categorizing (i.e. opting not to distinguish an opponent's discernably different RHP from one's own) can be adaptive when assessment is imprecise or expensive and mistakes can lead to dangerous combat. For large RHP differences between opponents, discriminating by acting on the discernable RHP difference is evolutionarily stable. For moderate RHP differences, typically neither categorizing nor discriminating is stable, but categorizing predominates if social interactions are frequent. More frequent interactions imply that the social status ultimately achieved is more important in accumulating fitness; this reduces the probability that a loser in combat will accept the submissive role without additional fighting, where this probability of 'surrender' expresses another mixed strategy. These patterns appear to fit the establishment of social relationships in some species for which combat is dangerous, and the analysis represents a step towards understanding the emergence of dominance hierarchies.
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Animal behaviour is fascinating yet challenging to document and understand, even in single individuals, largely because of its variability and apparent unpredictability. In the conflict situations common in nature, the advantages of being unpredictable may help to account for the frequency of such behavioural variation. From a game-theoretical perspective, when the costs of fighting exceed the expected benefits, the classic hawk-dove contest between equivalent opponents yields a mixed strategy as the evolutionarily stable strategy, ESS (Maynard Smith & Price 1973) . This equivocating solution generates behavioural variation as it gains the advantage of unpredictability.
However, most biological contests are played between opponents that differ, at least to researchers observing them, in ways that should influence the outcome, and these contests are therefore generally considered asymmetrical. Following the mathematical demonstration that mixed strategies cannot be evolutionarily stable in asymmetric games (Selten 1980) , some have concluded that mixed strategies are therefore very unlikely to be prominent in nature (e.g. Repka & Gross 1995; Gross 1996) . However, when asymmetries are categorical, that is, based on 'equivalence classes' of individuals (Hall 1996) that distinguish only between categories, mixed strategies can still be evolutionarily stable within categories (Crowley 2000; Flaxman 2000) . So the possible role of mixed strategies, and their potential to help account for behavioural variation, may hinge on the prevalence of such categorical asymmetries in natural systems. It is therefore important to consider how such categories might arise, and what kinds of strategies might be associated with them.
I focus on asymmetries associated with resource holding power (RHP; Parker 1974), although, of course, asymmetries uncorrelated to RHP can also be important (Maynard Smith 1982) . The generally strong link between body size and RHP (e.g. Archer 1988) means that distinct size classes arising from such features as age structure (e.g. Norling 1984), gender (e.g. Shine 1990), arthropod instars (e.g. Griffiths 1985) or genetics (e.g. Morris et al. 1995) 
